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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-3254 
_____________ 
 
MICHAEL TACCETTA, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-04439) 
District Judge: Honorable Faith S. Hochberg 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
February 13, 2015 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  April 13, 2015) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.   
 
 In 1994, Appellant Michael Taccetta pleaded guilty to organized-crime-related 
felonies in both state and federal court, and received lengthy concurrent sentences.  
Taccetta now argues that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) erred by refusing to credit a period 
of pre-sentencing detention against his federal sentence.  The District Court, noting that 
the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC) had already credited the time 
against Taccetta’s concurrent state sentence, concluded that the BOP had properly 
calculated Taccetta’s federal sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).1  We will affirm. 
I.  
 Taccetta, a member of an organized-crime syndicate in New Jersey, was arrested 
in January 1993 by federal authorities, charged with offenses under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68, and released on bail 
the same day.  In August 1993, while still out on bail, he was arrested by New Jersey 
state authorities for violations of state law and held without bail.  On September 20, 1993, 
the federal government obtained a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, which 
allowed federal agents to “borrow” Taccetta for his guilty plea in federal court that same 
day. 
                                              
1 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) provides that, in certain circumstances, an inmate shall 
receive credit against his federal sentence for “any time he has spent in official detention 
prior to the date the sentence commences” unless that time has been “credited against 
another sentence.” 
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 Pursuant to the writ, Taccetta remained in federal custody for his next several 
court proceedings, including when he pleaded guilty in state court on October 19, 2003 
and when a federal court sentenced him to 300 months’ incarceration on July 22, 1994.  
The parties agree that under customary writ practice, Taccetta should have been returned 
to state custody, at the latest, immediately after his federal sentencing.  For reasons 
unknown, however, Taccetta remained in federal custody.  He was again produced for 
state-court sentencing on August 10, 1994, where he received a 40-year concurrent 
sentence.  From 1994 to 1999, Taccetta served his concurrent sentences in federal prison. 
 In 1999, BOP officials reviewed Taccetta’s sentence and realized that Taccetta had 
never been returned to New Jersey custody on the writ ad prosequendum.  The BOP 
contacted the NJDOC, which agreed that Taccetta should have been returned to state 
custody after his federal sentencing.  In January 2000, Taccetta was transferred to state 
custody. 
 It later became apparent that due to various state credits, Taccetta’s 40-year state 
sentence would expire at least two years before his concurrent 300-month federal 
sentence.  This meant that Taccetta would eventually be required to return to federal 
prison, where his projected release date was (and remains) April 26, 2016.  Taccetta thus 
became concerned about which sovereign was crediting him for the 305 days he spent 
incarcerated between his federal guilty plea on September 20, 1993 and his federal 
sentencing on July 22, 1994: if the term were credited against only his state sentence, he 
would receive no tangible benefit, because the credit would simply hasten his transfer to 
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federal prison; if it were credited against both sentences or against his federal sentence 
alone, his total time of incarceration would be reduced by approximately 305 days. 
 In 2011, Taccetta’s attorneys contacted the BOP about this issue.  The BOP 
responded that the NJDOC had already credited the time against Taccetta’s state 
sentence, and the federal prohibition on double-counting in 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) 
prohibited the BOP from also crediting the same period against Taccetta’s federal 
sentence.  In response, Taccetta filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  The 
District Court concluded that the BOP had not abused its discretion with respect to the 
sentencing calculations and denied Taccetta’s habeas petition.  In early 2014, the NJDOC 
determined that Taccetta had completed his state sentence, and he was transferred back to 
federal prison to serve the two years remaining on his federal sentence. 
II.  
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). 
 Our review of the District Court’s legal conclusions underlying a denial of habeas 
relief is de novo.  Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Vega v. 
United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007)).   The BOP’s view of § 3585, as 
expressed through an interpretative rule, is entitled to “‘some deference’ so long as it sets 
forth a permissible construction of the statute.”  Blood v. Bledsoe, 648 F.3d 203, 208 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995)). 
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III.  
 Where a defendant faces prosecution by both state and federal authorities, the 
“primary custody” doctrine determines where and how the defendant will serve any 
resulting sentence of incarceration.  The basic principle is that the first sovereign to arrest 
the defendant is entitled to have the defendant serve that sovereign’s sentence before one 
imposed by another sovereign.  See Bowman v. Wilson, 672 F.2d 1145, 1153 (3d Cir. 
1982).  A sovereign can “relinquish” primary custody by releasing the defendant on bail, 
dismissing the charges, or granting parole.  See United States v. Cole, 416 F.3d 894, 897 
(8th Cir. 2005).  We have explicitly recognized, however, that temporary transfer of a 
prisoner pursuant to a writ ad prosequendum does not constitute a relinquishment.  Rios 
v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 274–75 (3d Cir. 2000) (collecting cases), superseded on other 
grounds, see United States v. Saintville, 218 F.3d 246, 249 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 Here, the federal government obtained primary custody of Taccetta by arresting 
him in January 1993, but relinquished custody by releasing him on bail.  New Jersey then 
gained primary custody by arresting Taccetta in August 1993, and retained primary 
custody because he was not released on bail.  The subsequent transfer of Taccetta to the 
custody of the federal government on a writ ad prosequendum did not result in a 
relinquishment of New Jersey’s primary custody.    
Taccetta first argues that he should receive federal credit for the period at issue, 
rather than state credit, because the record reflects an intent by New Jersey to relinquish 
primary custody to the federal government from September 20, 1993 onward.  As 
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evidence of that intent, Taccetta cites the fact that the parties negotiated a global plea 
agreement; that he was in federal custody at the time of his state-court plea and 
sentencing; and that he served six years in federal prison before being returned to the 
physical custody of New Jersey.   
 The record is unambiguous, however, that New Jersey never expressly waived 
primary custody, thus distinguishing this case from Shumate v. United States, 893 F. 
Supp. 137, 142–43 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that local authorities relinquished primary 
custody by signing express waiver).  And Taccetta points to no case in which we have 
recognized a tacit or implied relinquishment of primary custody.  In fact, quite to the 
contrary, we have held that “the length of time in federal detention” is irrelevant to the 
question of relinquishment.  Rios, 201 F.3d at 274.  We thus conclude that Taccetta was 
in the primary custody of New Jersey throughout the period at issue; that the BOP was 
entitled to respect the NJDOC’s decision to credit that time against Taccetta’s state 
sentence; and that the BOP was then prohibited under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) from also 
crediting that time against Taccetta’s federal sentence. 
 Taccetta’s second argument is that we should extend the reach of Willis v. United 
States, 438 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), and Kayfez v. Gasele, 993 F.2d 1288 
(7th Cir. 1993), which approved narrow exceptions to the rule against “double-counting” 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).  Those rules are now applied nationwide by way of BOP Program 
Statement 5880.28, which provides that a federal prisoner can receive credit from both 
sovereigns for a particular stretch of incarceration under a narrow set of circumstances 
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involving the “effective full term” (EFT) of each sentence.  See BOP Program Statement 
5880.28, at 1–14 (defining an ‘EFT’ as the full sentence length without including any 
potential time credits).  The Willis rule applies only if: (1) the state and federal sentences 
are concurrent; and (2) the state EFT is equal to or shorter than the federal EFT.  Id. at 1–
22 through 1–22A.  The Kayfez rule applies only if: (1) the state and federal sentences are 
concurrent, (2) the state EFT is greater than the federal EFT; and (3) the state EFT, after 
application of qualified presentence time, is reduced to a date that is earlier than the 
federal EFT.  Id. at 1–22B through 1–23A.  The purpose of both rules is to address 
scenarios where a credit against a concurrent state sentence “would not benefit [the 
defendant] except that . . . he would be serving only one sentence instead of two 
concurrent ones.  Crediting [the disputed period] against his federal sentence will correct 
the problem.”  Kayfez, 993 F.2d at 1290. 
 In this case, Taccetta’s state EFT (40 years) was greater than his federal EFT (300 
months).  Thus, the reasoning of Willis is not applicable and Taccetta is not entitled to 
any benefit under Program Statement 5880.28.  Even after the subtraction of the 305 days 
of presentence time at issue, his state EFT still results in an expected release date roughly 
14 years later than his federal EFT, thus ruling out Kayfez.  While acknowledging that he 
does not fall within the ratio decidendi of either Willis or Kayfez, Taccetta argues that the 
holdings of these cases should be extended to cover his situation: his actual maximum 
release date on his state sentence occurred sooner than his maximum release date on his 
federal sentence, and thus he received no benefit from his credit for time served.  
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 But, as the BOP has interpreted § 3585(b), credit towards a term of imprisonment 
is calculated not based on the actual length of the sentence but on the effective full term.  
As noted in Kayfez, the BOP’s decision to use effective full terms for purposes of 
implementing § 3585(b) was a policy adopted for “administrative convenience” because 
“[t]o do otherwise would require the Bureau in all similar cases to consider the 
complexities and details of rules which vary from state to state[.]”  Kayfez, 993 F.2d at 
1290.  The Kayfez court expressly concluded that “the Bureau’s exclusive reliance on the 
full term is reasonable.”  Id.  Taccetta provides no case law to the contrary, and we see no 
other reason to revisit or reject this widely accepted standard.  Accordingly, we will not 
grant relief on this basis.  
IV.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
